Hello and welcome to today’s Facebook Press Call. There will be prepared remarks and a Q&A to follow. To ask a question after the prepared remarks conclude, please press star one. Now, I’d like to turn the call over to Andrea Saul who will kick this off.

Andrea Saul: Hi, everyone, and thank you for joining us for the fourth edition of our Community Standards Enforcement Report. Today on the call, you’ll hear from Mark Zuckerberg, Guy Rosen, Monika Bickert, and Vishal Shah, and then we’ll take questions. This call is on the record. With that, I’ll go ahead and kick it over to Mark. Mark?

Mark Zuckerberg: All right. Hey, everyone. Thanks for joining us today. Today we’re publishing our fourth Community Standards Enforcement Report, which shows progress we’re making towards finding and removing harmful content.

Before we get into the details, I want to talk for a bit about why we do this. Our services gives billions of people a place to express themselves and make their voices heard, and while we air on the side of free expression, we do have community standards to define what’s acceptable on our platforms and what isn’t.

We generally draw the line at anything that could lead to real harm like terrorist content or child exploitation imagery. It’s worth remembering that this is a tiny fraction of the content on Facebook and Instagram, and we remove much of it before anyone ever sees it.

But this is some of the worst content that’s out there, and when people are sharing billions of things a day, even a tiny fraction is too much. So, we’re focused on improving how we identify and remove this harmful content.

Now, those of you who follow us closely know how large our investments are both in people and technical systems to address these issues. We now have more than 35,000 people working on safety and security, and our security budget is billions of dollars a year, more than the whole revenue of our company was at the time of our IPO earlier this decade, so we can now do things that just weren’t possible even several years ago.
And I think the systems that we built for addressing these issues are more advanced other what any other company has and we're going to keep investing in this going forward.

We're also committed to transparency (inaudible) that harmful content on our services because they don't want to admit that they have problems too, or in most cases, they don’t share anywhere near as much detail as we are here.

And I think that that's an issue because it means that as a society, we don't know how much of this harmful content is out there and which companies are actually making progress. And sometimes as a society, we set the wrong incentives by giving companies a pass when they sweep their issues under the rug.

Now, if we can't understand the true prevalence of harmful content across these services, we can't build the right systems for stopping it, and that's why I've called for regulation to set clearer rules for the Internet around harmful content for our industry as a whole.

But in the absence of this regulation, we’re going to keep publishing these reports so people can see the scale of these issues and hold us accountable for improving our systems. We're making some real progress here, but our systems aren't perfect and being transparent helps us keep pressure on ourselves to always keep doing better.

In a few minutes Guy is going to walk through some of the key findings from the report. But the short summary is that we're seeing our efforts payoff in a couple of important areas.

When it comes to hate speech, our systems now proactively identify about 80 percent of the content that we remove, that's up from just 24 percent that we identified proactively 18 months ago and almost 0 percent 24 months ago. So, that's some real progress.

Hate speech has been a significant more difficult problem than identifying problematic images, for example, because it involves a lot of linguistic nuance. For example, if someone posts a video of a racist attack in order to condemn it, than that should be OK. But if someone posts that same video to glorify it or encourage other people to copy that kind of attack, that violates our standard.

So sometimes we the people using clearly offensive slurs, but other times we see people using new words that were previously benign to encourage violence and in different places around the world as well.

We operate in more than 100 languages and in countries all around the world, so there are a lot of different context understand and I'm proud of the progress that we're making here, although of course there's still a lot more to do.

The last thing that I want to callout up front is that we're now able to include more metrics in our transparency reports. For example, we're now share information about the amount of suicide and self injury related content, as well as more robust data on terrorist propaganda.

And because we use the same systems and teams for our safety work across the company, we're also now able to report on Instagram for the first time covering four categories to start, child nudity and child sexual exploitation, regulated goods, suicide and self injury, and terrorist propaganda. And Vishal will talk more
about this in a few minutes as well.

So as I said before, this work is never finished, and we still have a lot more to do, both on enforcing our policies for each specific type of harmful content and building better systems for finding and removing it proactively. And with that, I'm going to hand it over to Guy to go into some more of the detail.

Guy Rosen: Thanks, Mark. Good morning everyone, I'm Guy Rosen and I lead the engineering team that the company focused, on safety and integrity. So today, I'm going to walk you through some of the highlights from this fourth edition of our report.

Over the past several years, we've really changed how we approach all of this work, and as Mark mentioned we've been able to massively invest in all things safety and security.

The developments over the past years in A.I. mean that our system increasingly can detect content proactively before anyone reports – sometimes before anyone even sees it. Most of (inaudible) identifying the experiences that billions of people around the world actually have on our apps, using that to identify the biggest gaps and executing on a multi-year plan to improve.

As we’ve instrumented our systems and developed metrics that we use internally, we now include those same metrics in this report so that people can hold us accountable for our progress. Some updates in this fourth edition, so first as Mark mentioned, we’re now including data on Instagram.

Since the acquisition, we’ve worked toward the place we’re at today where Facebook and Instagram are able to use the same reporting tools, detection systems, refuse systems, measurement infrastructure, and this alignment means we’re now able to report on Instagram here and on the progress that we’re making to help keep people that use Instagram safe.

We have one central team responsible for developing solutions like A.I. systems and they are applied across our services. Historically some of these systems were built first on Facebook’s platform and later applied to the other services. That means that in some areas these systems are still a little further ahead on Facebook than they are in Instagram and that may be at times reflected in the report today.

Secondly, we’ve expanded policy areas that are covered in this report. So this includes our suicide and self injury policy, a very sensitive, a very complex issue and we work with experts to prioritize people’s safety when we remove content that depicts or encourages this type of harm.

We’ve also expanded how the report covers our efforts against terrorist propaganda and Monika will speak more to the specifics there. Overall, the report now covers 10 policy areas on Facebook and 4 on Instagram.

I’d like to go over and call out a few key highlights across three key metrics that we watch closely, prevalence, content action, and proactive rate. Let’s start with prevalence. This is perhaps our most important metric and it measures how much bad content that people actually see.

You can think of it as something like an air quality test to determine the concentration of pollutants in the air so just like an environmental regulator might periodically sample air quality to calculate what percent of the air we breathe is, let’s say...
sample air quality to calculate what percent of the air we breathe is, let’s say, nitrogen dioxide. We periodically sample content that people view on Facebook or on Instagram to calculate what percent violates our policies.

We focus on how much content is seen, not just how much shared content is out there that violates our rules. Today’s report shows for example that the amount of adult nudity that people are seeing on Facebook is on a decline.

For every 10,000 times people view content on Facebook, between 5 and 6 views violated this policy and that’s down from around 12 to 14 a year ago. This is a result of improvements to our process, to our training, and to proactive detection technology.

Now for some policy areas, particularly those that address the most severe safety concerns, things like child nudity and sexual exploitation, regulated goods, suicide and self injury, terrorist propaganda, what we’ve found is the likelihood that people view content that violates these policies is extremely low and when we do this exercise of sampling content to measure prevalence, we might not find any violating samples at all. So this would be just like sampling air quality and not finding any nitrogen dioxide.

What we do in these cases is we statistically calculate an upper limit. In other words, us finding little to no samples means that the actual likelihood that people, who use our services, see this content is between zero and this limit.

And in the third quarter of this year that upper limit was 0.04 percent. That means out of every 10,000 views we estimate it that less than (inaudible) views (inaudible) while (inaudible) and we’ve been able to provide this estimate both on Facebook and for Instagram.

The second metric is how much content we took action on. This includes removing content but also applying a warning screen or disabling accounts, and it reflects how often people violate our policies and how much of it we identify.

This also means it can fluctuate up and down a lot. For example, if we find and remove a handful of viral memes that violate a policy it might drive up the number one quarter but then the number will drop the next quarter people no longer try to share those memes.

It will also go up as we expand our systems to proactively detect more kinds of harmful content and you can see some of these increases, for example on suicide and self injury where in the third quarter we took down 2.5 million pieces of content up from 2 million in Q2.

There’s also increases in the amount of content we took down for regulated goods, both illicit firearms sales, drug sales. These also reflect improvements in our proactive detection systems.

On child nudity and sexual exploitation, we fixed an issue in one of our systems. We reported on this last time we did this report that impacted our ability to add new hashes of videos that we had already removed. We went back and removed the content that we may have missed and it’s partially as a result of this correction that there was an increase in the third quarter.

The third and final metric is proactive rate. This typically reflects how affective AI is in a particular policy area as it shows how much of the content that we took action on was detected by our systems before someone reported the content to us.
And in eight of the policy areas in this report we proactively detected more than 95 percent of the content we took action on Facebook usually much more. This reflects the progress in applying AI to these areas.

There’s a lot more work left to do but we’ve made progress here. In any of these areas that progress requires us to work across multiple disciplines, engineering, operations, policy. And now, I’ll turn it over to Monika to talk a little bit more about that work.

Monika Bickert: Thanks, Guy and hello everyone. I’m Monika Bickert and I lead the team that writes the rules for what is and isn’t allowed on Facebook, what we refer to as our community standards. I’ll be talking about how often people appeal our decisions when they think we’ve gotten it wrong and some recent updates we’ve made to strengthen our enforcements against harmful content.

As Mark mentioned we’re now being more specific about content that we’ve taken down as terrorist propaganda. Now we’ve long had policies that ban all praise, support, and representation of terrorist and terror organizations.

To date, our previous reports have included data on our efforts to proactively detect and remove content pertaining to ISIS, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates. But we’re now expanding the report to include enforcement against all terrorist organizations.

We continue to invest in automated techniques to combat terrorist content and we’re always evolving our tactics because we know that the bad actors will continue to change theirs.

When it comes to hate speech it’s important to understand linguistic and cultural nuance when writing and enforcing policy. Over the last two years we’ve invested in proactive detection of hate speech so that we can detect this harmful content before people report it to us and sometimes before anyone sees it.

Our detection techniques include text and image matching, which means we're identifying images and identical strings of text that have already been removed by us as hate speech and machine learning classifiers that look at things like (language as) reactions in comments to a post to assess how closely that content matches common phrases, patterns, attacks (in) previous content that violates our policies against hate.

Initially, we've used these systems to proactively detect potential hate speech violations and then send them over to our content review team, since we know that people can better assess context where artificial intelligence cannot.

Starting in the second quarter of 2019, thanks to continued progress in our systems' abilities to correctly detect violation, we began removing some posts automatically, meaning the technology made the decision to remove the post.

But that's only when the content is either identical or near-identical to text or images previously removed by our content review team as violating our policy, or where the content very closely matches common attacks that violate our policy.

We do this only in select instances. And it's only been possible because our automated systems have been trained on hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of different examples of violating content and common attacks.
Now in all other cases, when our systems proactively detect potential hate speech but we don't have that level of certainty, the content is still sent to our review teams to make a final determination, meaning somebody looks at that content and applies our policies.

With these evolutions in our detection system, our proactive rate has climbed from 80 percent -- I’m sorry, has climbed to 80 percent from 68 percent in our last report. And we've increased the overall volume of content we find and remove for violating our hate speech policy.

While we're pleased with this progress, these technologies are not perfect and we know that mistakes can and will still happen. That's why we continue to invest in systems that enable us to improve our accuracy in removing content that violates our policies while safeguarding content that discusses or condemns hate speech.

Similar to how we review decisions made by our content review team in order to monitor the accuracy of our decisions, our teams routinely review removals by our automated system to make sure that we are enforcing our policies correctly.

Advances like this are only possible because of the strong partnership between our policy, product, and operations teams. These teams work together to address enforcement.

My policy team writes our community standards, Guy's engineering team develops the artificial intelligence and technical tools that help us detect content, and the content review team, under our operations team, apply and enforce our policies.

We've continued to improve our detection systems because of the feedback loop between policy, product, and operations, increasing the volume of hate speech content we've removed as well as the proactive detection rate for the second quarter and the third quarter in 2019.

The other thing we've done on the enforcement side is expand significantly on the appeal available to people who think their content may have been mistakenly removed, either by our automated system or by the people on our content review team. Over the past couple of years, we've rolled out appeals across Facebook, and more recently across Instagram.

Our appeals process helps us to review and restore content we may have incorrectly removed. For example, after increasing our enforcement on bullying and harassment, we received appeals for about 714,000 pieces of content in the third quarter, and we ended up restoring about 99.9 thousand of those upon reviewing the content a second time.

This appeals process is really important because it helps our teams understand where we might need to improve and increase the precision of our review efforts, or (inaudible).

Our community standards exists to help people feel safe in expressing themselves on our services. And we take very seriously our responsibility when building policy and what is and is not allowed on Facebook.

As our technologies evolve, we’ll continue to be open about our progress in enforcing
and reporting on these policies. To further our commitment to transparency, we’re sharing data on how we are doing at enforcing our policies on Instagram for the very first time. And for on this, I’ll turn it over to Vishal.

Vishal Shah: Thanks, Monika. I’m Vishal Shah, Head of Product at Instagram. In this first report for Instagram, we’re providing data on enforcing our policies in four areas, child nudity and child sexual exploitation, regulated goods, specifically firearms and drugs sales, suicide and self injury, and terrorist propaganda.

We plan to share data on additional policy areas in future reports. Before sharing data, I wanted to point out the inherent differences between Facebook and Instagram and the effect these differences have on the data.

While we use the same technology to find and removed harmful content across both Instagram and Facebook, the metrics may be different across the two surfaces. There are many reasons for this, including the differences in the apps functionality and how they’re used.

For example, Instagram is focused on visual content, doesn’t have groups, pages, or links and reshares and feeds. There’s also the differing sizes of our communities. Over a billion on Instagram compared to 2.4 billion on Facebook. And there are places in the world where people use one app more than another.

Finally, as Guy mentioned, there are differences in the maturity of our AI systems. We encourage the community to focus on holding Instagram accountable by comparing our progress quarter over quarter, and not by comparing our numbers to Facebook’s.

Also since the central team was able to extend the appeals process to Instagram for the first time in July of 2019, this report does not include data on appeals and restores for Instagram, but we’ll be including it in the future.

In Q3 of this year, we removed 754,000 pieces of content that violated our policy on child nudity and child sexual exploitation. Of which 94.6 percent we detected proactively.

For regulated goods, we removed 58,600 pieces of firearms sales content and about 1.5 million pieces of drug sales (content), of which we detected 91.3 percent of firearm sales and 95.3 percent of drug sales proactively.

We removed 133,300 pieces of terrorist propaganda content, of which 92.2 percent we detected proactively. For suicide and self injury, we removed about 845,000 pieces of content in Q3, of which 79.1 percent we detected proactively.

I wanted to pause on this policy area because it’s really important to us. Suicide and self injury are complex issues with many contributing factors. We aim to strike the difficult balance between allowing people to share their mental health experiences, which can be important for recovery, while also protecting others from being exposed to potentially harmful content.

One of the areas we made real progress is on removing graphic self injury and suicide imagery, as well as content that promotes this type of behavior, all of which is against our policies.

We allow people to speak openly about their recovery journey. Or to share what they’re going through in a hard time, but we’re not recommending that content to others. We’ve built new technology to identify and remove known suicide
and self injury related posts from parts of Instagram where people discover new content, for example in “explore,” “search,” and “hashtag.”

I’m glad to have Instagram included in this going forward, I know I speak for both Guy and Monika when I say there remains serious work ahead to make our product safer. But we’re making great strides in catching, improving content (inaudible) our (rules) across our services.

We’ll continue to expand our data to include additional policy areas and updated metrics and future reports. And we’ll keep sharing progress on the ways in which we’re combating harmful content. On that, I’ll open it up for questions.

Operator: We will now open the line for questions, please limit yourself to one question per person. To ask a question, press star followed by the number one. Your first question comes from the line of Alex Heath from The Information, please go ahead.

Alex Heath: Thanks for taking my question. Mark, you started this call by saying that you wish others in tech were being as transparent as you guys are in disclosing these kind of numbers and content takedowns.

I’m curious (how) you square that with the push towards encryption that you guys are making across all the products and for, you know, WhatsApp is not included in this report today it seems like, as an example.

I’m just curious how you guys are going to be able to keep disclosing information like this once messages on Facebook messenger or Instagram are eventually encrypted, thanks.

Mark Zuckerberg: Sure, so -- I think at a high level, you’re pointing to a real tension, which is that encryption makes it harder for us to see some of the content that’s in the services.

The encryption that we’re proposing certainly wouldn’t make it any harder for us to identify or provide transparency on any of the behavior across Facebook or Instagram that we’re talking about here.

And in general, what we believe you need to do when -- while building on encryption is do extra work to improve on safety and identify bad actors. And we can do this upstream of -- whether that’s identifying people who might be reaching out to minors in the case of child exploitation, (enforcing) the content, we can do that by looking at patterns of bad activity.

So for example, a lot of how we find election interference is not necessarily by looking at the content directly it’s by looking at the patterns of activity of the accounts and seeing when accounts aren’t really behaving in the way that people would.

So, we believe that by working with the right safety groups by getting feedback upfront before we implement encryption, we’re going to be able to build this in a way that takes into account the safety considerations that we need to in order to provide an experience which is the most private and the safest.

The point that I was trying to make here is I think an important one. It’s that -- there is this perverse incentive that I think is sometimes set up. I’m not only suggesting that the other technology companies report on this, I’m sort of
suggesting now, if I were a reporter, or a politician investigating this, how I would think about looking into that as well.

Because right now, I think that sometimes there’s a -- this kind of inverted incentive where some folks look at the numbers that we’re putting out and saying “OK we found all this harmful content” and come to the conclusion that because we’re reporting big numbers that must mean that so much more harmful content that’s happening on our services than others.

And I don’t think that that’s actually what this says at all, what it says is, if anything, is that we’re working harder to identify this and take action on it and be transparent about that than what any others are.

So, I just think that that’s an important thing. Certainly I do think that transparency reports would be a valuable part of (any regulation) around a (harmful content). I’ve talked (about that) publicly. But I just think that for society overall, we should think about what incentives we’re creating for these companies.

And I don’t think we want to create an incentive where companies -- where it’s in their interest to just not pay attention to safety issues because they just get a pass, whereas while others seem to be reporting on the issues that they have and honestly trying to grapple with them might get more criticism for the large numbers that we’re finding and trying to deal with.

Operator: Your next question comes from Kurt Wagner from Bloomberg.

Kurt Wagner: Hey, thanks for taking the question. Actually two quick ones for Mark from the speech you made at Georgetown. The first is that, you know, for those of us who have followed the company for a long time, it was really kind of surprising.

That was the first time it seemed like you really admitted that getting into China was not going to happen for Facebook, and I’m wondering if there was any specific moment in the last year or so that has officially changed your mind on Facebook’s potential there. And then secondly, you, in that same speech, accused TikTok of censorship.

And I know there’s been some media reports about that, but I’m wondering, have you guys at Facebook been monitoring that or is that something you’ve seen firsthand, or is that something, when you say that, were you just (heckling) those media reports? Thanks.

Mark Zuckerberg: Sure. So I mean, on the competitors -- I mean, you can do your own analysis of what they’re doing. And we certainly look at -- look at everything that’s out there and -- as well. On China more broadly, I mean look, I haven’t really, you know, made any -- there’s no mystery that we -- that I believe that it would be good if we could offer our services in China.

You know, we believe in giving people a voice and believe that that can contribute to making a more open society. And I was optimistic that we’d be able to do that, and we were never able to come to an agreement on what it would take to do that, so we’re not there.

Now, the position that we’re in today, you know, certainly when looking at what others are facing across the economy and other companies, you know, I think what’s clear is that operating there today kind of cuts both ways. Maybe you have an
impact there but you’re also playing a role in spreading Chinese values that we may not agree with to other countries around the world as well.

So you know, part of what I see is that because of how this played out and because we were never able to come to an agreement on a way where we would be able to operate there, we’re now in a position where we’re much more free to stand up for the things that we believe in than I think most other companies that are operating there.

Operator: Your next question comes from the line of Julia Boorstin from CNBC. Please go ahead.

Julie Boorstin: Thanks so much. I’m just wondering if you could give us any sense of the business implications of any of these (changes, be it) improvement in identifying the harmful content, the ability to take it down? If you could just speak to what this means either for advertisers or engagement, anything impacting financial performance. Thank you.

Mark Zuckerberg: So, I think the biggest business impact of all this is the massive cost that we’re putting into (inaudible). Right?

And this is why I emphasize routinely in our earnings calls to audiences that primarily care about the financial impact, but this is something that we invest billions of dollars into every year, and I do think it’s somewhat staggering (of a fact) that our IPO (in 2012) (inaudible) now invest more in just this part of what we do, safety and security than the whole revenue of the company was at the time.

We have more people working on it than the whole body of the company at the time. It’s a (inaudible), and that’s certainly weighs on our profits, but there’s no question to me that that’s the right thing to do. It’s just that when we’re making a decision like that, I also think that we have a responsibility to go out and talk to investors to make sure that they understand the trade offs that we’re making.

In terms of the engagement, I think sometimes people try to make this argument that they think we let some content slide because we want more of it on the service. I think that’s a very low proportion of the content which is harmful content, which Guy talked about before, shows that that really doesn’t make sense as an argument.

If anything, you have brand safety concerns from advertisers that they don’t want their advertising to be near any of this stuff, which if anything gives us an incentive to go more aggressively at this, but I don’t think that that is that big of a level either way in terms of determining what we’re doing either.

Certainly we care about that, but in general we’re going to do what we think is the right thing. We’re going to stand up for free expression and try to hold the line where we think that that’s the right thing and for the content that we think is truly harmful and (inaudible) we’re going to invest a lot in building A.I. systems and teams of people to go out and identify and remove as much of this as possible.

Operator: Your next question comes from the line of Queenie Wong from CNET. Please go ahead.

Queenie Wong: Thank you so much for taking the time to answer my question. So, I was wondering how are you approaching content moderation in stories? Like
wondering how are you approaching content moderation in stories? Like content that disappears in 24 hours? Is that more challenging to moderate than other types of content?

Guy Rosen: Hey, this is Guy. Our community standards applies to stories just in the exact same way. You can report a story. Our proactive protection systems apply to stories. So generally the approach is, by in large, the very same approach to make sure that people don’t post content that violates our policies to stories as well.

Operator: Your next question comes from the line of David Uberti from Vice News. Please go ahead.

David Uberti: Hey. Thanks all for taking the time to answer some questions. I’ve one for Guy or potentially Monika. Guy, I was just reading through your blog post about some of the take downs related to Christ Church content.

You said essentially that there had been 3 million additional take downs of posts since that initial 24 hour period that you guys had previously talked about. Any sense of whether those posts came from content that had been on Facebook from the time of the attack onward, or have people been essentially trying to upload more content over these last six months?

Guy Rosen: Hey, so it’s a good question. The (way) we detect this video is essentially this video’s completely blocked from our system, so if someone tries to upload it, we will detect it and we will remove it.

The video and various clips of the footage just continue to – people continue to try to spread it and share it, and that’s where our systems continued to try to enforce this. And you’re right, overall from the attack and until the end of the third quarter, 4.5 million pieces of content were detected, some in the (first) and 97 percent of that was identified proactively by our system.

Operator: Your next question comes from the line of Tony Romm from Washington Post. Please go ahead.

Tony Romm: Hey guys, thanks for taking my question. This is a question for Mark. I’m sure you guys know, there is a letter that was circulating from Facebook employees, suggesting a number of potential changes, the way that you guys approach political ads, things like limiting micro-targeting for example, heightening labeling, (verification) things and that sort.

Can you comment on whether this is something you're actively considering and just what your thoughts generally might be here? I know you said in the past that you’ve stood by the decision you guys had made on the call, but are you considering some of those changes? Thanks.

Mark Zuckerberg: Sure. I’m going to give a short answer to this so we can stay focused on the topic of the call. But yes, we’ve said publicly that -- I’ve explained why the policy is what it is, but I’ve also said that we're continuing to look at how it might make sense to refine it in the future. I’ll share more details if we have anything in the future.

Operator: Your next question is from the line of Julie Jammot from AFP, please go ahead.

Julie Jammot: Hi. My question is about (those 35,000 people) who work on (face team security). How many of those are (fake) and how many work for your
partners? And just (tell me when) would it be easier (for Facebook) to not (inaudible) operating? Thank you.

Monika Bickert:  
Hi, this is Monika. We have a mix of full-time employees and contract employees that work on our content moderation teams. Really our goals when we're sort of thinking about how to construct that workforce is making sure that we have coverage around the clock and coverage around the globe, and that also means taking into account that we have many languages that we need to review.

So sometimes this means finding speakers of languages halfway around the world from where you would normally find those native speakers. So, we do you find that useful to have a mix of full time employees and contractors.

The one thing I'll say is, all of these content reviewers are subject to the same controls in terms of their training and the way that their quality is audited so we can make sure that we are reviewing content accurately and quickly.

Operator: Your next question comes from the line of Ezra Kaplan from NBC News. Please go ahead.

Ezra Kaplan: Hi there, thanks for taking my question. Just curious, in terms of expanding from just ISIS and Al Qaida in terms of terrorist groups, how are you going to proceed in defining what a terrorist group is? Thanks.

Monika Bickert: Our definition of terror groups, which we've had for a long time, many years, is that we don't allow any group that has proclaimed a violent mission or engaged in document acts of violence.

So it does not consider what the specific root of the ideology is, it's just whether or not this is a violent actor. And of course the groups that meet the definition will continue to evolve overtime, and in fact we've seen that we will sometimes has offshoots of well known groups emerging, and trying to stay ahead of that is a key goal of our team.

We now have more than 350 people working at the company whose primary responsibility is countering terrorist group members (who attempt to use this).

Now part of that means hiring people who are experts, who have spent their careers in understanding terrorist ideology and terrorist groups, not only because of the expertise they bring to the company but also because they maintain relationships with the academics and those in the security world who are studying the evolution of these groups so that if there is a new offshoot group, we can be aware of it and we can make sure we’re catching it early.

Andrea Saul: And we have time for one more question.

Operator: Your last question comes from the line of (inaudible) from The Daily Telegram. Please go ahead.

Male: Hi there, everyone. Thanks very much for this. I have one question which is about Instagram. It was very encouraging to see the very (low response) to suicides and self harm content on the server.

At the same time this week Ian Russell, the father of Molly Russell who died by suicide in the U.K. in 2017 and he's previously partly blamed Instagram for that happening said he was grateful that Instagram was doing something but he
He said that he thought that getting rid of harmful material was easier than the internet giants made out and he said he doesn’t think the platform is safe for young people right now.

Even this was in August but at that time even comparing the company to tobacco where you’re selling a product where you could harm people. I wonder if you could – what do you say to that and what would your response to that be?

Vishal Shah: (inaudible) from Instagram, nothing is more important to us than the safety of the people using Instagram, especially the young people use our platform. And to strike this balance that I mentioned earlier, allowing people to share their mental health experiences which is really important for their recovery but also protecting others from being exposed to harmful content.

Now, I think thinking about the ways these platforms work and making sure that we’re addressing and updating our policies as it makes sense is also important.

So here we changed our policies to ensure that all graphic content that might be showing suicide or self injury is no longer allowed even if it was for the purpose of admission. Our policy has always been clear, we don’t allow endorsement or glorification but in the case of a visual heavy platform like Instagram, we want to make sure that we take that content down.

We’ve also increased our ability to proactively help people who are looking for help whether that’s (inaudible) in the (product) when they’re searching for hashtags or searching for content that might be related to suicide or self injury and even just very recently we updated our policy to ban fictional content including memes and (illustrations).

So, we’re always needing to respond to new trends and new behaviors. I’m proud of the fact that we’re explaining what we’re doing both in terms of policies but also in terms of the prevalence of this content.

There was always room to improve. The fact that we can leverage all the great work that’s happened at Facebook and make sure that we can apply them to the way Instagram as a platform works is something that I’m really proud of us for taking on even though there is much work to do.

Monida Bickert: And in addition to the work that we’ve done specifically on Instagram, I want to reiterate what Vishal is saying that are sometimes very tough decisions to be made about competing safety interests and we don’t think we should make those decisions alone and, in fact, that’s why we work with experts in self harm prevention across the world.

Now, we’ve worked with those experts for years but this past year we have increased the frequency of those meetings so that we’re actually getting together once a month and we’re getting their input on how we should be making specific calls.

And just to give you an example, if somebody talks about wanting to hurt himself or herself it might be the most likely way to get some help. (Inaudible) and the research shows this, the experts tell us this, that might be the way that a family member will know to reach out, so we know that can be really important for safety.
At the same time, we know that seeing a post like that can also potentially be upsetting or even triggering for somebody else in the community and those are the sorts of decisions where getting expert input is so important and that’s something that we are committed to doing regularly and building that into our policies.

Molly Russell’s death was absolutely horrific and it’s a tragedy that we want to make sure that we as a society are learning from and that means making sure that we are talking to experts and seeing what they’re seeing so we can build the best systems we can.

Andrea Saul: Great, and thank you everyone for taking the time to join us today. Have a great day.

Operator: This concludes the Facebook press call. Thank you for joining. You may now disconnect your line.

END